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Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for
the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation
close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency
relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed
to beneﬁt from a market power in terms of external funding oppor-
tunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, we prove
that the agency costs can be negative, either when the manager or the
investor acts as the leader in the agency. These results suggest that
external conditions may have a diﬀerentiated impact on the ex ante
and ex post ineﬃciencies created by managerial opportunism.
keywords : corporate ﬁnance, agency cost, market power
JEL classiﬁcation : G3
1 Introduction
The article by Jensen & Meckling (1976) belongs to the most cited papers in
Finance. It is today a classical reference in all the textbooks as the seminal
1contribution to the ownership and control issue which has become a central
piece of governance theory. Its main contribution is to provide a microe-
conomic analysis of the agency costs generated by the existence of outside
equity :
In most agency relationships, the principal and the agent will incur positive
monitoring and bonding costs and in addition there will be some divergence be-
tween the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare
of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction of welfare experienced by
the principal due to this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and
we refer to this as the residual cost. We deﬁne agency costs as the sum of (i)
the monitoring expenditures by the principal (ii) the bonding expenditures by the
agent (iii) the residual loss. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308)
Hence disregarding the monitoring and the bonding costs, the agency
cost measures the loss in gains from trade (to all the parties) speciﬁcally
due to the asymmetric information prevailing in an agency relationship.1.
Of course this makes sense with respect to a ﬁrst best arrangement where
the managerial opportunism does not hold. To be conceptually consistent,
this arrangement has also to take the form of a contract which becomes
eligible to the parties if some institutional rules of transparency are met2.
Of course, such a benchmark contract can also be refused by the parties
who are both entitled to consider outside opportunities. Then measuring
agency costs amounts to compare two types of contracts, each of them being
associated with outside opportunities. These outside opportunities are related
to external market conditions that determine the agency costs and, in some
cases, may lead to negative values. Examining the circumstances where this
occurs is the subject of the paper.
Using a formulation close to the equity model by Jensen and Meckling, we
consider an entrepreneur (or a manager, ”she” ) who raises equity funds from
an outside investor (”he”) to undertake a ﬁxed investment I. Managerial op-
1Asymmetric information is conceptually related to the timing of decisions of the par-
ties, as the contract is set before the agent takes actions. Uncertainty does not matter per
se: the model of Jensen and Meckling is deterministic.
2Empirical studies devoted to agency costs evaluation use corporations where the man-
ager is the sole shareholder to build a zero agency cost benchmark cf. e.g. Ang, et al.,
2000.
2portunism is interpreted here in terms of accountability. If the manager is
accountable for the expenses and gains he makes in the name of the corpora-
tion, the agency problem does not arise. If the manager is not accountable,
she is allowed te free ride ; the agency costs are evaluated by diﬀerence of
payoﬀs between these situations.
The key ingredient of our approach is that the investor beneﬁts from out-
side lending opportunities at a free risk rate r ≥ 0. This actually reﬂects the
market power the investor enjoys on the ﬁnancial market, as an intermedi-
ary or a bank. Thus we depart from the standard point of view adopted in
governance theory where the ﬁnancial market is systematically assumed to
be competitive (cf. Tirole, 2006). We will show that, for high values of the
interest rate, the agency costs may be negative. This means that the agency
ineﬃciency is mitigated when the ﬁnancial market becomes very attractive.
The paper is organized as follows : the ﬁrst section is devoted to the pre-
sentation of the model. Two types of arrangements are considered according
to whether the investor (section 3) of the manager (section 4) gets the lead-
ership in the contract setting. Concluding remarks are given in section 5.
2P r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e m o d e l
On a given period of time, the investment I to be undertaken under the
responsibility of the manager yields a net proﬁt R.T h e c o n t r a c t t o b e
signed beforehand stipulates the amount K the investor will spend to ac-
quire (1 − α)% of equity share, where α ∈ [0,1[ is ﬁxed. Let us denote
D the dividend to be distributed. The manager beneﬁts from two types of
returns: the (oﬃcial) income V and the pecuniary beneﬁts (or perquisites) F
encompassing, for instance, travel expenditures and other private activities.
The trade-oﬀ between them is given by the utility U(V,F),w h e r e f u n c t i o n
U is an increasing function of each argument, ∂U/∂V> 0,∂U/∂F>0.
In our agency setting, the contract takes the form of a game, where one of
the parties makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other one. In this context
the design of the contract depends on: (i) the allocation of the ﬁrst mover
advantage between the parties, (ii) the utility/payoﬀ gained by the parties
relatively to the outside opportunities available to them, (iii) the manager
3accountability. Let us examine how combining these elements determines the
various options to be considered.
1. The leadership - or ﬁrst mover advantage - may be attributed to the
investor or the manager. The party who acts as the leader beneﬁts
from a market power which determines the outcomes of the contract.
2. The contract may be signed or not (i) If the contract is not signed, the
investor does not invest in the ﬁrm’s capital and switches to privileged
lending opportunities on the ﬁnancial market at a risk free rate r, that
are not accessible to the manager. The manager remains a 100% owner
of the ﬁrm; in the absence of contract, the project I collapses and the
ﬁrm is reduced to its baseline activity, with a proﬁte q u a lt oR − δ,
where δ ≥ 0 accounts for the added value of the contract, namely
the speciﬁc contribution of the project I to the value of the ﬁrm. The
utility reservation of the manager is the utility level she enjoys when the
contract is not signed, deﬁned here as U0 = U(V0,F 0) where (V0,F 0)=
argmax(U(V,F), s.t. V + F = R − δ). is solution of :
(
V + F = R − δ,
∂U/∂F = ∂U/∂V.
(1)
(ii) If the contract is signed, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt R is boosted through the
added value δ, the manager who receives K and keeps α% of the share,
enjoying an utility level U(V,F). Through the contract the investor
who spends K yields a margin M =[ ( 1 − α)D − K] and a surplus
G =[ ( 1− α)D − K] − rK, where the cost of capital is deduced 3.
3. In agency theory, the opportunism of the agent comes from the non
observability of eﬀort. The lack of eﬀort induces a loss of proﬁt, as-
similated here to perquisites. Hence in our context, observability of
eﬀort means manager accountability for her perquisites. Accordingly
the agency costs have to be deﬁned by measuring the impact of account-
ability on the payoﬀs both parties ; then two types of arrangements have
3G c a na l s ob ec o n s i d e r e da st h enet proﬁt of the investor if the capital K is borrowed
at rate r. Hence rK can be equivalently interpreted as the actual or the opportunity cost
of the capital.
4leadership: ↓ Non accountable Accountable
Investor A B
Manager C D
Table 1: The 4 arrangements
to be compared: (i) When the manager is accountable, the perquisites
are considered as private expenses that do not alter the dividend, i.e.
D = R, and the perquisites are directly deduced from her income, so
that V = αR + K − F (ii) When the manager is not accountable,s h e
is allowed to incorporate the perquisites in the operating cost of the
ﬁrm so that the dividend is reduced to D = R − F and her income is
V = αD + K = α(R − F)+K. in this case, the manager acts as a
free rider as she enjoys a perquisites level F while paying only αF.
As a result, four arrangements have to be considered, as summarized in
table 1.
3 Investor leadership
In this case, the investor acts as the principal in charge of oﬀering the amount
K he is willing to spend to acquire (1 − α)%of shares. The manager acts
as the agent ; he has to react to this oﬀer. The problem can be stated as
a three stage game where the payoﬀs depend on the manager accountability
for the perquisites. Let us examine ﬁrstly the accountable case.
3.1 Arrangement A : Investor leadership with manager
accountability
When the manager is accountable for the perquisites, the gain of the investor
is G =( 1−α)R−(1+r)K, which does not depend on F. This arrangement
yields the ﬁrst best solution of the agency problem. Arrangement A deals
with the following sequential game :
• In stage 1, the investor proposes to buy the (1 − α) shares for K .
5• In stage 2, the manager accepts or refuses the proposal.
• In stage 3,
— In case of refusal, the manager keeps 100% of share and the proﬁt
incurs a loss δ, leading to utility level U0 = U(V0,F 0).
— In case of acceptance, the manager chooses her mix of beneﬁts
(V,F) under the constraint:
V + F = αR + K. (2)
Let us determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game via





The ﬁrst-order condition is :
∂U/∂F = ∂U/∂V. (4)
In stage 2, the manager accepts the deal if her utility is higher or equal
to what she get in case of refusal, namely :
U(V,F) ≥ U0. (5)
Then, formally the investor’s program in stage 1 leading the manager to
accept the deal is the following principal-agent problem :
(
maxF,V,K G
s.t (2), (4) and (5).
(6)
where (4) and (5) are the incentive compatibility and the participation con-
straints of the manager. In the following we will assume that
αR ≤ (R − δ), (7)
so that the manager would prefer to refuse the contract if the investor brings
no fund. The following proposition yields the equilibrium solution of this
agency problem.
6Proposition 1 When the manager is accountable, she gets the outside op-
portunity utility level U0. The equilibrium mix of beneﬁts coincides with the
outside opportunity mix (V0,F 0) and the investor pays K0 =( R−δ)−αR ≥ 0,
to get (1 − α) share. The margin of the investor M0 is equal to δ and his
proﬁti sG0 = δ − rK0.
Proof. Using (2), the gain of the investor may be written G =( 1+
αr)R − (1 + r)(F + V ). Then program (6) amounts to minimize a positive
linear combination of V and F; accordingly, constraint (5) is binding and the
optimum mix (V,F) is solution of: the system :
U(V,F)=U0,
∂U/∂F = ∂U/∂V.
Since function U is concave, the iso-utility curve U(V,F)=U0 is convex
in the plane {V,F}, so that the pair (V0,F 0) i st h eu n i q u ep o i n tw h e r et h e
slope of the tangency is equal to -1. The investment K is determined by
(2). It is positive thanks to (7). Hence the result.
According to (7), the contract induces a potential loss of dividend (R −
δ) − αR ≥ 0 to the manager. In equilibrium the contribution of the investor
exactly compensates this loss; the investor captures all the added value δ
created in the project while the manager does not change her mix of beneﬁts.
3.2 Arrangement B : Investor leadership without man-
ager accountability
In this arrangement, the perquisites F spent by the manager for her private
use are added to the reported costs of the company, so that the distributed
dividend is actually R−F; then the gain of the investor is G =( 1−α)(R−
F) − (1 + r)K and the budgeting constraint is now:
V + F = αR + K. (8)
This changes only the payoﬀs in the previous sequential game. Now the ﬁrst
order condition holding at stage 3 is ∂U/∂F = α∂U/∂V, and the investor’s
stage 1 program (6) is formulated in a similar way.
7Proposition 2 When the manager is not accountable, she gets still the out-
side opportunity utility level U0. Both the investment and the margin of the
investor are lower than in the accountable case..
Proof. Using similar arguments as in proposition (1), the equilibrium
mix of beneﬁts of the manager is (V1,F 1) is solution of
U(V,F)=U0,
∂U/∂F = α∂U/∂V.
Since function U is concave, the iso-utility curve U(V,F)=U0 deﬁnes
a convex curve V = f(F). We have V0 = f(F0), with f0(F0)=−1 and
V1 = f(F1), with f0(F1)=−α. Hence F1 ≥ F0, since the derivative f0 is
increasing, and V1 ≤ V0. In addition the convexity implies that the curve
V = f(F) is above the tangency at point F0 and the tangency at point
F1. This implies the following inequalities :
V1 + F1 ≥ R − δ ≥ V1 + αF1 (9)
Thanks to (9), the investment K1 = V1 − α(R − F1) is lower than K0; in
addition, we have M1 =( 1− α)(R − F1) − K1 = R − F1 − V1 which is, by
(9), lower than M0 = δ.
3.3 Comments
Under the non accountability arrangement, as expected, the manager selects
am i xo fb e n e ﬁts more favorable to the perquisites since she actually pays
only α% of them: the inequality F1 >F 0 captures the ex post ineﬃciency
eﬀect as it implies a dissipation of the margin of the investor, who only gets
a part of the added value δ i nt h ec o n t r a c ts i n c eM1 <M 0 = δ. This leads
in turn to ex ante ineﬃciency as the investor invests less (K1 <K 0) since
strategically he expects the opportunistic behavior of the manager.
The solution is represented on ﬁgure (1) where the various solutions are
depicted in the plane {V,F}
In the accountable case, the equilibrium point is the point Z =( V0,F 0)
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Figure 1: Investor leadership
line CD of equation V + F = R − δ. Segment BA is the line of equation
V + αF = αR and the investment K0 is measured by AD; segment AC
measures the margin M0 gained by the investor. In the non accountable
case, the equilibrium point is M =( V1,F 1).
In this context the agency cost covers the impact on accountability on
the payoﬀs of both parties. Since the utility of the manager is kept at level
U0, this amounts to compare the proﬁts to the investor G0 = M0 −rK0 and
G1 = M1 − rK1. Hence the agency cost reduces to G0 − G1, which can be
interpreted here as the cost of accountability.
When r =0 , the conventional result is found4, saying that the oppor-
tunistic behavior of the manager is detrimental to the investor, who incurs
an agency cost equal to M0 − M1 > 0. But this result may no longer hold
for strictly positive values of the interest rate, since the cost of capital rK is
lower in the non accountable case and then diﬀerently aﬀects the surplus of
the investor under both arrangements.
Let r∗ =( M0 − M1)/(K0 − K1) be the break even rate clearly (i)
for r<r ∗,the agency cost is positive and accountability is worthy (ii) for
4.It is worth mentioning that M0,M 1,K 0 and K1 do not depend on the interest rate r
9r ≥ r∗,the agency cost is negative.5. Then for high values of the interest
rate, the manager accountability is worthless for the investor since it implies
a higher level of investment and then a higher capital cost which reduces the
gain of the investor.
3.4 Illustrative example
Let us consider the case where the utility of the manager is U = VF.




α (R − δ),V 1 =
√
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. For instance, with
R =5 0 ,δ =5 ,α =0 ,8 we have r∗ =5 ,9%. As a matter of fact, for
r =7 % , we have G0 =1 ,5 ≤ G1 =4 ,54 and K0 =5 ,K 1 =0 ,25 and the
investor is better oﬀ in the non accountable case.
4 Manager leadership
L e tu st u r nn o wt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h em a n a g e ra c t sa st h el e a d e r :s h ei sn o w
in charge of making an oﬀer K to the investor against (1 − α) share of the
equity.
4.1 Arrangement C : Manager leadership and account-
ability
As in arrangement A, the gain of the investor is G =( 1− α)R − (1 + r)K.
The arrangement C is represented by the following game :
• In stage 1, the manager proposes to sell the (1 − α) shares for K .
5Let r1 =( 1− α)(R − F1)/K1 − 1=
(1−α)(R−F1)
V1−α(R−F1) − 1= R−F1−V1
V1−(αR−αF1) and r0 =( 1 −
α)R/K0 − 1= δ
(1−α)R−δ =, be the internal rates of return associated with the gains G1
and G0 respectively. Thanks to (9), for α < 1, we have 0 <r ∗ <r 0 <r 1. Then the gains
of the investor under both arrangements are positive for interest rate values close to r∗
10• In stage 2, the investor accepts or refuses the deal,.
• In stage 3: in case of refusal, the investor gets a gain (surplus) equal
to zero. In case of acceptance, the manager chooses her mix of beneﬁts
(V,F) under the constraint:
V + F = αR + K, (10)
Solving the game by backward induction leads, at stage 3, to a manager
program still given by (3) ; the ﬁrst order condition is again (4). In
stage 2, the investor will accept the deal if he gets a positive surplus,
namely :
(1 − α)R − (1 + r)K ≥ 0. (11)
In case the investor rejects her oﬀer, the manager does not undertake
the project I and, as previously, keeps 100% of the equity with a rebate




s.t (10), (4) and (11).
(12)
It can be checked that, under the concavity of utility function U,t h e
investors’ participation constraint (11) is binding at the optimum so
that:
(1 − α)R = K(1 + r), (13)
Eliminating K in (13) and (10) we deduce :










is solution of the system {(14),(4), or,





11And the investor spends ˜ K =( 1− α)R/(1 + r) to acquire (1 − α)share of
equity.
This model does not resort to the standard principal-agent model, as the
manager is both the ﬁrst mover and the last mover player of the game. Con-
ditions (4), (11) can be interpreted respectively as the incentive-compatibility
and the participation constraint of this agency problem. But here, the partic-
ipation constraint is related to the investor and the incentive-compatibility
constraint to the manager.
4.2 Arrangement D: Manager leadership without ac-
countability
The non accountable case leads here to a game deﬁned by replacing con-
straints (2) and (13) respectively by V +F = α(R−F)+K and (1−α)(R−












and the investor pays K0 =( 1− α)(R − F0)/(1 + r).
On ﬁgure (2) which replicates ﬁgure (1) when the manager is the leader,
the accountable equilibrium corresponds to the point Ωr located on the line





(R − F),and the accountable to the point Φr






Accountability does not matter for the investor since his gain is zero
under both arrangements. The agency cost reduces to the utility variation h




When the interest rate r is equal to 0, the Jensen-Meckling equity solution is
found6. In terms of utility, the accountable case coincides with the ﬁrst best
6Then the Nash equilibrium conditions given here are an analytical substitute to the
























Figure 2: Manager leadership
solution, where the manager is able to develop the project keeping 100% of
the equity. In this case, (14) et (16) yields ˜ V + ˜ F = V 0 +F0 = R, so that the
equilibrium points Ω0 et Φ0 are located on the segment AB: the accountable
equilibrium point (˜ V,˜ F) corresponds to the greatest value of utility U on
this segment, then U(˜ V,˜ F) >U(V 0,F0). The lack of accountability increases
the perquisites ( ˜ F ≤ F0) and induces a loss of utility : in turn, this ex post
ineﬃciency reduces the amount the investor is ready to pay to get equity;
this is the source of ex ante ineﬃciency that makes the manager worse and
generates a positive agency cost.
But this result may no longer hold when the interest rate is high.
Proposition 3 When the manager is the leader, there exists an interest rate
value r∗∗, such that for any r ≥ r∗∗, she is better oﬀ in the non accountable
than in the accountable case, and the agency cost is negative.
Proof. When r →∞ , the accountable solution (˜ V∞, ˜ F∞) satisﬁes the
relation V +F = αR. Clearly, when r →∞ , relations (16) sound as the ﬁrst
13order conditions (which are also suﬃcient) of the program:
(
maxU(V,F)
V + αF = αR,
(17)
the solution of which is the non accountable point (V 0
∞,F0
∞). Since utility
function U is strictly concave, the solutions of the program (17) is unchanged
when the equality constraint is replaced by the inequality V + αF ≤ αR.
Clearly, V + F = αR implies V + αF ≤ αR. Hence the accountable point
(˜ V∞, ˜ F∞) b e l o n g st ot h ei n t e r i o ro ft h ef e a s i b l es e to ft h em o d i ﬁed program
(17); it is dominated by the optimum (V 0
∞,F0
∞). As a result, U(˜ V∞, ˜ F∞) <
U(V 0
∞,F0
∞). Consequently, since the opposite inequality holds for r =0 , there
exists an intermediate value of the interest rate, r∗∗ such that, for any r ≥ r∗∗,
the agency cost is negative.
The higher is r, t h el e s st h ee xa n t ei n e ﬃciency works: for high values of
r, the outside lending opportunities are more attractive and the involvement
of the investor in the equity decreases, so that the manager may act more
independently from the investor: Hence the manager is better oﬀ under the
non accountable arrangement. A contrario, when the rate r is low, the in-
vestor is more inﬂuential on the manager who is thus penalized in the non
accountable case.
Remark 4 It may happen that the manager would be better oﬀ by not letting
the investor entering the capital of the ﬁrm. This can be considered by in-
troducing a stage 0 in the sequential game, where the manager has to decide
whether he makes or nor an oﬀer. She will make no oﬀer if the utility gained
through the deal is lower than U0.
If, as in arrangements A and B, we assume that condition (7) already
holds, then the deal is not proposed for r = ∞. In this situation, there exists
a threshold value ¯ r above which the manager prefers to stay alone. Hence the
negative agency cost conﬁgurations may occur only when r∗∗ ≤ ¯ r.
If the condition (7) is not met, an oﬀer is always made by the manager
and then the agency cost is negative for any r ≥ r∗∗.
144.4 Illustrative example
Let us illustrate the results on the previous example, with U(V,F)=VF.We





and V 0 = αR 1+αr
α+2αr+1,F0 = R 1+αr
α+2αr+1 :E q u a t i n g







, which coincides here with
the break even rate r∗ in the investor ﬁrst mover case (but this is due to the
multiplicative form of utility). For instance, with R =5 0 ,δ =5 ,α =0 .8
we have r∗∗ =5 ,9%. As a matter of fact, for r =0 .07 = 7%, we have
ˆ V = ˆ F =2 4 .67,V0 =2 2 .09,F 0 =2 7 .61. In terms of utility, we get U0 =
506.25 <U (ˆ V,ˆ F)=6 0 8 ,61 <U (V 0,F0). The manager is better oﬀ in the
non accountable case and she does make the oﬀer.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Agency cost is a key concept of organization theory as it reveals the exis-
tence of ineﬃciencies operating within agency relationships, which have to be
reduced by incentives schemes designed to align the interests of the parties
involved in the organization. This concept is a central piece of corporate
ﬁnance since the contribution of Jensen & Meckling which is considered now
as the cornerstone of the dominant doctrine prevailing in business on ex-
ecutive compensation. This relies upon the widely shared idea that agency
cost is truly a loss, namely it cannot be negative, in other words that man-
agerial opportunism is detrimental for the organization. There is no formal
evidence on this point, as we prove in this paper. Negative agency costs may
occur when the outside ﬁnance providers have proﬁtable alternative funding
opportunities. This result suggests that market pressures may aﬀect the out-
puts of the organization and lead to some arrangements less favorable than
others in terms of eﬃciency. A similar idea emerges in channel distribution
literature (cf. Greenhut and Ohta, 1979, Thépot and Netzer, 2008) where
oligopoly competition between channels on the ﬁnal market may make ver-
tical integration less proﬁtable, contrary to what happens in the monopoly
case. This indicates, once again, that external pressures on the organization
may contribute to the eﬃciency.
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